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1. Introduction 
This report is one in a series of reports that evaluate the implementation and impacts of 
the 2007/08 and 2008/09 Malawi Agricultural Input Subsidy Program (MAISP). The 
focus of this report is the impact of the program on the structure and performance of the 
input supply sector, with particular attention to the contribution of the program to the 
development of commercial input supply for both seeds and fertilizers. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief review of the 2006/07 MAISP evaluation findings concerning 
the input supply sector and recommendations for improvements in the program that were 
made by actors in the sector. Chapter 3 introduces the 2007/08 and 2008/09 programs, 
focusing on how the overall program design for each year differed from the 2006/07 
design and the impact that these changes had on the overall structure of the input supply 
sector. Chapter 4 describes the data collection and analysis methods used to assess 
impacts on the sector and problems encountered in implementing the study. Chapters 5 – 
7 are the analytical kernel of this report: chapter 5 examines the evolution of retail input 
supply enterprises over three years from 2006/7; chapter 6 focuses on the seed program 
and impacts; chapter 7 the fertilizer program.  The following topics are addressed in the 
analytical chapters: competition in the sector; impacts on costs, cash-flow and profits; 
private sector confidence in the sector; prevalence and magnitude of voucher 
implementation problems experienced by retailers. Chapter 8 ends the report with a 
summary of key findings and recommendations for improvements. 
2. The 2006/07 Malawi Agricultural Input Subsidy Program Evaluation 
The 2006/07 evaluation examined the impact of MAISP on the input supply sector, with 
particular attention to the program’s contribution to the development of private sector 
input supply systems, drawing on extensive interviews with input suppliers (i.e., fertilizer 
importers and distributors and seed manufacturers) and a survey of retailers (i.e., 
independent agro-dealers, managers of distributor retail outlets such as RAB and 
Farmers’ World, and government-run ADMARC and SFFRFM outlets). Section 6 of the 
overall 2006/07 evaluation report presented a synthesis of the views of this diverse set of 
actors and their recommendations for improvements in the program.   
In general, the actors interviewed were positive about the program. For fertilizer 
suppliers, the key accomplishment in 2006/7 was the inclusion of private sector suppliers 
in the program after a year (2005/06) of having been totally excluded and left with large, 
expensive carry-over stocks at the end of the 2005/6 season.  For seed suppliers, the 
introduction of the maize seed voucher was considered a major step forward in terms of 
helping Malawian farmers access more productive varieties and helping seed companies 
build demand for their products.  The views of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
2006/07 program as synthesized from data collected through interviews with fertilizer 
importers and distributors, seed company managers, and representatives of the fertilizer 
and seed suppliers’ professional organizations are summarized in Box 1.1. 
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Box 1.1 Supplier views on strengths and weaknesses of the 2006/7 voucher 
program 
 
At the procurement level, suppliers supported the voucher program, but continued to 
stress that stability in the broad design features and implementation characteristics of the 
program is much more important to their performance than the type of program itself. 
Stability (and hence predictability) in the program characteristics over several years 
should reduce the amount of annual planning and consultation needed, ensure early 
announcements of tenders, and enable efficient, low-cost procurement. Common 
recommendations for addressing the weaknesses in the 2006/7 program offered by 
informants at the procurement and supply level included: 
• Using the more flexible seed voucher approach for both seed and fertilizer; 
• Improving voucher distribution so that it is earlier (June/July when cash is 
available from sales of other crops) and the control is in the hands of agricultural 
staff and Village Development Committees;  
• Reducing ADMARC/SFFRFM share of the market (in a reasoned and predictable 
manner) and using saved resources to improve the quality of their services; 
• Monitoring product quality (and increasing sanctions for violations) through joint 
action by professional organizations and government; 
• Expanding the agrodealer network while insisting on registration to maintain 
quality controls; 
• Sustaining maize prices through programs that will increase price stability 
(including research and incentives for development of maize processing 
industries). 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Very efficient Logistics Unit operations 
• Private sector was empowered 
• Constructive government, donor, 
private sector dialogue began 
• Use of government infrastructure to 
complement private sector 
• Payment for fertilizer vouchers was 
timely, at least at the beginning 
• Seed program left choice to farmers 
• Seed program presented marketing 
opportunity to private sector 
• Poor farmers were helped 
• Most input suppliers and retailers had 
better sales this year than last year 
• VERY late design and implementation 
• Poor tendering process (started early but then 
canceled); second round lacked transparency 
• Poor voucher design led to fraud and vouchers 
not honored by Logistics Unit 
• Low redemption value for fertilizer vouchers 
(especially for remote locations) 
• MK rather than US$ redemption value increases 
supplier risk 
• Slow voucher processing by ADMARC/SFFRFM 
jeopardizes cash flow for seed sector 
• Weak institutions for monitoring product quality  
• Information campaign gave too much attention to 
fertilizer and did not provide clear understanding 
of who should get vouchers 
• In some cases voucher sales are simply replacing 
commercial sales rather than adding to them. 
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At the retail level, there were a large range of implementation problems encountered 
(stock outages, long lines, delayed voucher reimbursement, etc.). Strong views were 
expressed by retailers about the inadequacy of the coupon distribution program and what 
could be done to improve it. Only 9% suggested that the distribution system continue as it 
was conducted in 2006/07. Fifty-five percent of retailers suggested that different actors 
than were involved in 2006/07 needed to be given the responsibility for coupon 
distribution in the future, but there was no consensus concerning the appropriate actors. 
In response to a question about what could be done to improve the physical supply of 
inputs, the most common responses were better timing (28%) and better mix of products 
(13%). Some thought the system was satisfactory as is (11%) and 12% offered no 
suggestion. 
Despite the implementation weaknesses most actors believed that the general concept of 
an input subsidy administered through the use of vouchers redeemable at both public and 
private input shops was a good one. Very few respondents to the retailer survey (10%) 
suggested that the program be ended or that the government go back to one of the earlier 
models (TIP, Starter Pack).  Reasons for not wanting to continue with the voucher 
program included corruption, a perception that few were benefiting, and its having had a 
negative impact on their sales. Those wanting to continue the program offered a wide 
variety of reasons that are difficult to summarize; the most common included: 
• It assists the poor (27%) 
• It promotes hybrids (8%) 
• It assists small farmers (7%) 
• It reduces hunger and increases yields (6% each) 
• It increases business (5%) 
We present this synthesis of input sector views about the 2006/07 subsidy program as a 
jumping off point for reviewing how well the 2007/08 and 2008/09 programs responded 
to these recommendations put forward by key actors in the 2006/07 program. 
3. Salient characteristics of the 2007/08 and 2008/09 AISP  
3.1 2007/08 
The 2007/08 program design was similar to that of 2006/07 with minor modifications 
(LU final report, April 2008). 
The year-to-year similarities affecting the input supply component included: 
• Selected farmers throughout the country received vouchers that could be 
exchanged for fertiliser and seed when surrendering the voucher plus a cash “top 
up” of 950 MK for fertilizer and a variable amount not to exceed 90 MK for 
hybrid seeds. 
• The Government issued a tender for the purchase of fertiliser to be delivered to 
one of three SFFRFM regional depots, from which Government (through a tender 
process) would arrange transport to ADMARC and SFFRFM unit markets where 
farmers could make their voucher purchases 
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• In addition a number of known agriculture inputs retailers with rural outlets were 
authorised to accept the vouchers together with the cash “top up” in exchange for 
fertiliser (and/or seed) supplied by these retailers 
• The provision of seed to the farmers was the responsibility of recognised seed 
growers (Pannar, Monsanto, Seed Co, Demeter, Funwe plus the AISAM 
agrodealer network) who stocked rural outlets at which the farmers could obtain 
the seed when surrendering the voucher plus a cash “top up”. 
The year-to-year differences affecting input suppliers included: 
• The farmer’s contribution to the cost of the fertiliser provided was reduced from 
MK 950 per 50 kg bag (2006/07) to MK 900 per 50 kg bag (2007/2008) 
• In an attempt to encourage expansion of private sector involvement in more 
remote rural area, the Government agreed to pay an incentive bonus in selected 
EPAs for NPK and urea vouchers surrendered from these EPAs. The amount paid 
was MK 100 or MK 200 on top of the district value of the voucher depending on 
the EPA. 
• Retailers were authorized to request a top-up not to exceed 90 MK/voucher for 
hybrid seed voucher redemption (there were no seed voucher top-ups in 2006/07). 
Since the amount of “top up” was determined by suppliers, it could vary and was 
therefore the cause of some confusion and resentment on the part of farmers. 
• Flexible vouchers, which could be surrendered in exchange for a variety of seed 
types namely cotton, beans, soya, groundnuts or maize, were introduced. 
• At the end of the programme (December/January) cotton chemical vouchers were 
introduced (these were not covered by our input supplier assessment). 
The “remoteness” premium did encourage some private sector actors to deliver to more 
remote locations than they had the previous year. This was accomplished via direct 
deliveries to temporary distribution points and/or agreements with independent 
agrodealers who acted as agents for the distributor. There is no evidence that the program 
led to any permanent changes in the structure of the distribution networks in the more 
remote areas. 
The introduction of the flexi-voucher stimulated some interest in the development of seed 
supply for alternative crops, but most flexi-vouchers were used for maize. It is not clear if 
this was by preference or because of limited supplies of alternative seeds. 
The major challenge emanating from the program changes was due to confusion over the 
top-up for the hybrid seed vouchers. This resulted in major disruption of sales by the 
private sector and unwarranted accusations of illegal practices. It created serious 
problems for many independent agrodealers and the networks supporting them. Retailers 
who had praised the 2006/07 program as having helped them expand their businesses 
faced low, sometimes non-existent, sales in 2007/08 due to farmers’ misunderstandings 
about seed voucher pricing policies and an ADMARC/SFFRFM decision to not 
implement the authorized top-up for their shops. This Government decision forced all 
retailers to sell at the lower, face value of the voucher or risk not moving their stocks. 
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Many retailers who had initially posted the higher (authorized) prices, were stigmatized 
and unable to sell their stocks at all (see Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of the issue). 
3.2 2008/09 
The 2008/09 AISP was implemented during a presidential campaign. As a result, it was 
subject to intense scrutiny by opposition party candidates and decisions about voucher 
numbers and distribution appear to have been even more heavily influenced by political 
considerations than observed during the two earlier AISP evaluations, with widespread 
accusations of politicians having obtained access to vouchers. The extent to which 
politics influenced decisions about the overall program design is not clear. The following 
program elements were fairly consistent with earlier years: (LU final report, April 2009): 
• Selected farmers throughout the country received fertiliser vouchers that could be 
exchanged for fertiliser when surrendering the voucher plus a cash “top up” (of 
MK 800, down from 900 MK the previous year). 
• The Government issued a tender for the purchase of fertiliser to be delivered to 
one of three SFFRFM regional depots, from which Government (through a tender 
process) would arrange transport to ADMARC and SFFRFM unit markets where 
farmers could make their voucher purchases. 
• Selected farmers also received a seed voucher that could be exchanged for a seed 
package.  
• The provision of seed to the farmers was the responsibility of recognised seed 
growers (eight in number: Pannar, Monsanto, Seed Co, Demeter, Funwe, AISAM, 
Cargill, Great Lakes) who undertook to stock both ADMARC/SFFRFM unit 
markets and rural agrodealer outlets where the farmers could obtain the seed when 
surrendering the voucher. 
• Flexi-vouchers were also distributed to selected farmers. These could be 
surrendered in exchange for a variety of seed types namely cotton, beans, pigeon 
peas, groundnuts or maize. 
• Towards the end of the programme (December/January) cotton chemical vouchers 
were introduced (once again, our assessment does not address this topic). 
But 2008/09 brought with it a change that had major implications for the structure and 
performance of the fertilizer sector’s retail distribution system.  No agriculture inputs 
retailers with rural outlets were authorised to accept the fertiliser vouchers in exchange 
for fertiliser; only ADMARC and SFFRFM were authorized to redeem fertilizer 
vouchers.  
Initially, the various work plans for the 2008/2009 subsidy programme had included 
private retailers and as late as mid-October 2008 contracts had been issued to selected 
retailers. However these were withdrawn and on November 6th, 2008 an announcement 
was made that the agents for sales of fertiliser through the subsidy scheme would be 
ADMARC and SFFRFM only (LU report and author’s interviews). 
This decision was announced very late, and in many cases only after fertilizer distributors 
had already received draft contracts from the GOM authorizing them to redeem vouchers 
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and specifying quantities. The decision and reasons behind it are discussed further in 
Section 7.1. 
The impact of the GOM decision to exclude the private sector from retail distribution of 
fertilizer is complex. The decision had immediate implications for the conduct of this 
evaluation, particularly increased difficulty in getting quantitative information from some 
private sector companies who felt that their exclusion removed any obligation they 
previously had to provide the detailed purchase and sales data requested by the evaluation 
team). The decision also had government budget and cost implications for the subsidy 
program to the extent that ADMARC/SFFRFM costs are increased by over-extending 
their infrastructure and staff (we are unable to demonstrate this, given lack of availability 
of information on the ADMARC cost structure). Although difficult to quantify with 
precision, the decision may have contributed to reported farmer experiences of long lines 
at ADMARC/SFFRFM retail outlets, stock outages that could not be compensated for by 
private sector actors and, in the absence of private sector competition, and increased 
incentives for ADMARC/SFFRFM staff to request “tips” for services that should be free.  
The community survey conducted in 2008/09 provides some data on the tip issue. The 
survey interviewed community leaders for 86 of the enumeration units where the 
household survey was conducted. The community interviews were conducted in a group 
setting. After the group identified the principal retail outlets frequented by members of 
the community for redeeming their 2008/09 vouchers, interviewers asked a series of 
questions about the performance of the different outlets. One of those questions was 
about whether farmers felt obliged to pay tips at the different outlets in order to get 
served. Table 3.1 summarizes the responses.  
Table 3.1 Frequency of paying tips at outlets commonly used for redeeming coupons, 
2008/09, all regions 
 ADMARC SFFRFM Private Company Small 
Trader 
Never 42.2% 25.8% 47.1% 100% 
Seldom 15.7% 25.8% 11.8% 0% 
Often 42.2% 48.4% 41.2% 0% 
 Source: Community survey 
Since these responses are for 2008/09, the private sector responses apply exclusively to 
seed coupons while the government outlet responses apply to both seed and fertilizer 
coupons. While the share of communities saying “often” for each of the major types of 
supplier is approximately the same (41-48%), the higher rate of “never” responses for the 
private sector  and ADMARC compared to the relatively low rate of “never” for 
SFFRFM, may signal a problem that needs to be addressed by SFFRFM in particular. 
There were only two communities responding to this question for small traders, but in 
both cases no tips were paid. When comparing results for parastatal (ADMARC and 
SFFRFM combined) and the private sector (Private companies and small traders 
combined), differences were not statistically significant. The fact that just under half of 
all the communities interviewed felt that tipping was a common occurrence is disturbing, 
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as farmers end up paying more for their inputs than what they should be paying and 
obviously the poorer farmers without cash reserves are less well served than those with 
cash. We looked at these responses by region, but found no statistically significant 
variation across regions.   
In the longer term (perhaps only a year or two), the decision to exclude the private sector 
from fertilizer sales may also lead to major structural changes in rural retailing in 
Malawi. Many of the fertilizer distributors maintain retail outlets which supply farmers 
with a wide range of food products, hardware, and farm equipment while also buying 
crops from farmers; the financial viability of these outlets in the absence of profit from 
fertilizer sales appears to be in question (see Chapter 7 for more discussion). 
Changes in the seed program for 2008/09 were minor and focused on addressing some of 
the confusion associated with top-ups during the 2007/08 season: 
• Both types of seed voucher (maize and flexi-vouchers) carried a value of MK 680 
when exchanged for seed—top-ups were officially eliminated from the start of the 
season. 
The continuation of the flexi-voucher program led to some structural change in the seed 
sector with AISAM establishing itself as a registered legume seed producer (with 
assistance from ICRISAT in obtaining the base seed) and becoming an official member 
of STAM (Seed Trade Association of Malawi). Flexi-voucher use for non-maize seed 
products remained very low, however (about 350 tons). 
3.3 Size and structure of the input sector   
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the salient structural characteristics of the fertilizer and seed 
sectors as described in our 2006/07 input sector assessment. The figures identify the key 
actors involved at that time and the vertical and horizontal relationships among them. At 
the procurement level, there were a dozen actors in the fertilizer sector and half that many 
for seed.  At the retail level, many of the same actors are present in both the seed and 
fertilizer diagrams. 
In addition to the business enterprises, there are a number of professional associations.  
The Fertilizer Association and the Seed Trade Association were newly created in 
2006/07.  Each association’s aim is to improve professionalism in the sector and to 
represent their members in policy discussions with the GOM. The CNFA/RUMARK and 
AISAM networks of agrodealers were the result of donor-funded projects created to build 
a more vibrant private sector supply system. These networks focus on the retail level, 
offering business management and product training, credit guarantees (CNFA only), and 
periodic reports on market conditions for agrodealers selling fertilizer, seed, or 
agricultural chemicals. The NASFAM network of farmer cooperatives supplied inputs to 
members on a strictly commercial basis, but member cooperatives also benefit from 
donor funding that provides training and business management support.   
Government participation in the market—at both procurement and distribution levels—
has been highly variable from year to year, depending on decisions about input support 
programs. A strength of the government network is its ownership of 56 SFFRFM depots 
(up from 28 in 2005/06) and 666 ADMARC market units throughout the country 
(ADMARC reported 362 permanent depots in 2001), which serve as welcome input 
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distribution or sales points for many farmers who are not served adequately by the private 
sector. 
Figure 1 Structure of the Malawi Fertiliser Industry 
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Between 2006/07 and 2008/09, we note the following major changes in the configuration 
of the fertilizer supply sector. 
• NASFAM has withdrawn almost entirely from fertilizer supply as it struggles to 
keep its cooperatives running in the face of serious reductions in donor support. 
• RAB has withdrawn almost entirely from fertilizer sales due to uncertainty about 
Government’s intentions. 
• Yara closed down its international representation in Malawi, turning over an 
exclusive right to import Yara fertilizers to ARL. 
• Other international representations are likely to follow in Yara’s footsteps if the 
GOM continues to exclude the private sector from retail sales (the view is that one 
does not need a local representation to supply government only). 
• A relatively large number of “newcomers” have added their names to the rosters 
of companies bidding on GOM contracts for fertilizer imports.  
• FW/Agora/MFC all continue operations, but have had a substantially reduced 
share of the overall import market since 2006/07. 
• The fertilizer retail sector is highly volatile with multiple entries and exits each 
year; those who are surviving tend to supply niche markets that do not rely on 
subsidy fertilizer (dimba season production, estate sector, sales of fertilizer in 
quantities less than 50 kg). 
• The MFA has found it increasingly difficult to maintain cohesion among its 
members as the number of players in the sector (some very temporary and 
opportunistic) increases and GOM policies become less predictable. There 
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appears to be some tension between members who have invested heavily in the 
development of retail networks and those who restrict their activities to spot 
importing when the market is advantageous—a natural development given their 
different interests. 
 
Figure 2 Structure of the Malawi Seed Industry 
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In contrast to the fertilizer sector, the seed sector seems to have benefited from the 
subsidy program. The STAM continues to grow and has had some success in dealing 
with seed quality and classification issues as well as with supplier-GOM-donor 
negotiations about the redemption value of seed vouchers.  The distributor networks that 
were unable to sell fertilizers in 2008/09 (e.g., RAB, FW, Agora) were active in seed 
supply and plan to continue with this activity. As the subsidy program expands to support 
legume seeds, new seed firms have been created. The one challenging area is that many 
of the agrodealers who were unable to sell seed at anticipated prices in 2007/08 because 
of confusion over the voucher top-up have withdrawn from seed sales, in large part 
because AISAM, which was acting as a conduit between them and the seed companies 
authorized to redeem vouchers, has been forced to cut back their operations because of 
losses during 2007/08. 
It is important to stress that at the retail level independent agrodealers and distributors 
outlets tend to be multipurpose shops which carry a multitude of products. For example, 
among the independent agrodealers interviewed about their maize seed sales, only 66% 
declared maize seed as their primary source of income. Other products sold by this group 
include fertilizers (60%), legume seed (24%), vegetable seeds (55%), herbicides (45%), 
grain storage products (46%), agricultural equipment (36%), groceries (46%), hardware 
(23%), and clothing and housewares (20%). The large distributors such as RAB, Agora, 
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and Farmers’ World tend to carry a similar range of products, but often with greater 
variety and larger stocks in each outlet.  While agricultural inputs represent a principal 
source of income for most retail distributor and agrodealer outlets, the seasonality of 
these products is such that product diversification is necessary for year-round overall 
profitability. In addition, the distributor outlets and a few agrodealers purchase maize and 
other crops from farmers. 
4. Methods used in assessing impacts on the input supply sector 
Information used in the analyses of input sector impacts for 2007/08 and 2008/09 comes 
from (1) Logistic Unit reports on Malawi’s input sector; (2) key informant interviews 
with major fertilizer importers, major seed producers and importers, and representatives 
of input supplier organizations; (3) a survey of 230 retail outlets and (4) focus group 
discussions with farmer groups, and (5) group interviews with community leaders. 
For consistency, and to improve our ability to look at changes in the provision of retail 
services over time, we decided to interview the same sample of retailers covered in our 
2006/07 assessment. Details of the original sample selection are presented in the 2006/07 
evaluation report and will not be repeated here. Approximately 65% of retailers 
interviewed in 2007 were located and re-interviewed, with others either not available for 
the interview (some operate only during the peak input season and had already closed 
their shops) or no longer in the input business. Eighty-one new retailers were added to the 
survey as replacements, but we were unable to get the sample size up to the 2006/07 level 
of 271. Substantially more retailers interviewed in 2007 dropped out of the sample in the 
North and Center than in the South.  
Table 4.1 provides some general population and cropping information on the six districts 
covered, the number of retail outlets per district identified in the initial sampling frame, 
the number of outlets interviewed in 2006/07, the number interviewed in 2008/09, and a 
qualitative indicator of the density of the retailer coverage by district.  
The important point to retain about the sample is that it covers six purposively selected 
districts and therefore does not permit us to generalize the results to all districts in the 
country. What it provides is a snapshot of program impacts on retailers in these six 
districts where farmers have relatively high levels of access to input vouchers. 
Most of our analyses look at the impacts by region and/or type of actor, with a focus on 
the following groups:  
• Importers with distribution networks (e.g., Farmers World/Agora, RAB1, Export 
Trading, Nyiombo) 
• Importers with small or no distribution networks (e.g., Yara, Optichem, Optima, 
Sealand, Simama, Muli Brothers)  
• Farmer cooperatives (NASFAM affiliates and a few independent cooperatives)  
• Independent agro-dealers  
• Government distributors (ADMARC/SFFRFM) 
                                                 
1
 Strictly speaking, RAB does not import but orders through others such as Yara. Given its 
extensive network of retail outlets it fits better in this category than elsewhere. 
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Table 4.1 Geographic distribution of retailers surveyed 
Region District 
Sampling 
Frame 
(outlets in 
2006/07) 
Sample size 
2006/07-
2008/09 
Retailer 
Density 
in 
District 
District 
population 
Population 
density per 
sq. km* 
Percent crop 
area in Maize 
& Tobacco 
North Mzimba 132 50 / 39 High 524,014 
from 25-50 
in se to 50-
100 in w;  
M: 50-75%  
T: 10-25%  
 Rumphi 44 41 / 34 Low 128,360 50-100  M: 50-75% T: 10-25% 
Center Kasungu 78 50 / 38 Medium 480,659 50-100  
M50-75%     
T 10-25% n.; 
5-10%  s. 
 Lilongwe 140 50 / 41 High 905,889** 200-400  
M: 50-75%    
T: 10-25% 
nw 
 
South 
 
Blantyre 51 38 / 45 High 307,344**  400-800 M:50-75% 
 Machinga 52 42 / 33 Low 369,614  
2/3 of area 
50-100; 1/3 
100-200  
M:25-50%  
with some 
50-75% in n. 
*Excluding national park areas. **Rural population. 
Source: Compiled from sample data and the Malawi Atlas of Social Statistics (IFPRI, 2002). 
In 2006/07, we over-sampled agrodealers because they tend to be a very heterogeneous 
group2 and under-sampled ADMARC/SFFRFM outlets because they tend to be more 
homogeneous given their centralized management structure. We were not able to do this 
as much during the 2009 survey because there were fewer agrodealers that could be 
located. Table 4.2 compares the composition of the two samples (2007 vs 2009) by type 
of retailer, illustrating that the share of independent agrodealers and cooperatives in the 
sample declined from almost 50% in 2006/07 to just under 40% in 2008/09 while the 
share of distributor and government outlets increased. These changes must be interpreted 
with care. The increased number of distributors in the 2009 sample does NOT mean that 
the actual number of distributors in the population of retailers increased between the two 
years; it is rather a reflection of the fact that the actual and the relative number of 
agrodealers and cooperatives decreased, forcing the interview team to sample more 
distributors as replacements to maintain a reasonable total sample size. The increase in 
the number of distributor outlets sampled between 2007 and 2009 is a result of the timing 
of the 2009 survey (about a month later than the 2007 one) and an apparent decline in the 
number of agrodealers. The survey team was instructed to replace any 2007 interviewees 
who could not be located with interviewees in the same category (i.e., agrodealers with 
agrodealers, distributors with distributors). Given the large number of agrodealers who 
could not be located (some because they had gone out of the input business, some 
because they were temporary shops and closed for the season), the team was unable to 
                                                 
2
 Over-sampling heterogeneous groups helps to get a better picture of general tendencies within the 
group whereas too few observations increases the risk of selecting atypical cases that may result in an 
inaccurate picture of the overall group’s characteristics. 
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find a full set of replacements for the agrodealer category.  When this happened, they 
looked for alternative types of outlets such as the distributors:  most of these outlets 
existed in 2007 but were not interviewed. Because we did not have resources to do a full 
census of input retailers in these districts, we do not know if the change in numbers and 
shares for our sample reflects actual changes in the population of input retailers. 
Table 4.2 Composition of retailer sample by district and type of retailer 
Region District 
Distributors 
2007 vs 09 
ADMARC/ 
SFFRFM 
2007 vs 09 
Coops 
2007 vs 09 
Independent 
agrodealers 
2007 vs 09 
North Mzimba 10 - 21 5 - 6 4 - 2 31 - 10 
 Rumphi 2 – 6 24 - 20 6 - 2 8 - 6 
Center Kasungu 14 - 16 8 - 6 4 - 2 24 -14 
 Lilongwe 10 - 11 6 - 5 7 - 3 27 -22 
South Blantyre 5 – 5 15 - 16 0 - 1 22 - 23 
 Machinga 6 – 7 13 - 12 0 - 0 19 - 14 
TOTAL Number 47 - 66 71 - 65 21 - 10 131 - 89 
 Percent 17 - 29 26 - 28 8 - 4 49 - 39 
     Source: Retailer survey. 
Of the 230 retailers interviewed, 172 (75%) sell inputs year-round; 54 (24%) only during 
the rainy season, and 4 (2%) on an infrequent basis.  Eighty-two percent of distributors 
and 76% of agrodealers sell year-round while only 65% of government outlets do, 
illustrating the important role that private sector distributors play in supplying inputs 
during the increasingly important dimba season. 
Our assessment of the 2007/08 and 2008/09 season looks at selected indicators of retailer 
performance that were used in the 2006/07 survey: sales trends, income trends, numbers 
of firms entering or exiting the sector, investment, development of new services, and 
perceptions of the impact of the subsidy program on these indicators.  
We also report some results from the interviews with community leaders representing 86 
of the communities in which the household survey was conducted. The leaders were 
asked about changes in the number and types of retail supply outlets used by farmers in 
the community and about the prevalence of different types of problems encountered when 
farmers redeemed their vouchers. In some cases, the results of the community survey 
differ from the results of the retailer survey. This is a logical outcome of the different 
sampling methods used. The community survey results should be viewed as broadly 
representative of the situation facing farmers throughout the country. While the retail 
survey results cannot be generalized nationwide, they provide more detail on what is 
happening to different types of retailers in the six districts covered and are therefore very 
useful in terms of understanding the AISP impacts on the retail network in these districts. 
5. Evolution of retail input supply enterprises from 2006/07 to 2008/09 
Although the primary objective of AISP is to improve food security by assisting farmers 
to increase yields and incomes, a secondary objective is to build a reliable input 
distribution system with an appropriate mix of government and private sector services. In 
this section we look at the activity mix and growth of input suppliers in our sample by 
category of supplier. When appropriate, differences across districts are also highlighted. 
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5.1 Importance of maize seed and fertilizers in enterprises interviewed 
A series of retrospective questions posed to the 2008/09 sample of retailers suggests that 
during the past three years, there has been a steady reduction in private sector 
participation in both maize seed and fertilizer marketing—the two inputs at the center of 
the subsidy program (Table 5.1). First, we note that the number of input retailers selling 
neither fertilizer nor maize has doubled during the period covered (from 9 retailers to 18). 
Those selling neither are predominantly independent agrodealers (77-78% in 2006/07 and 
2007/08, but increasing to 89% in 2008/09).  There has been a tendency for the number 
of retailers selling just one of these two target products to increase over time while the 
number selling both declines. Most of the changes are accounted for by independent 
agrodealers and cooperatives; however a few distributor shops also stopped selling one or 
the other product. 
Table 5.1 Number of sample retailers selling maize seed and/or fertilizer by year 
 
Maize seed 
sales but not 
fertilizers 
Fertilizer sales 
but no maize 
seed sales 
Both fertilizer 
and maize seed 
sales 
Neither 
fertilizer nor 
maize seed 
sales 
2006/07 29 9 183 9 
2007/08 33 11 173 13 
2008/09 36 14 162 18 
2008/09 as % 
of 2006/07 124% 156% 89% 200% 
Source: Retailer survey, 2008/09. 
Note: Most retailers interviewed sell a range of products including other inputs (e.g., chemicals), hardware, 
clothing, etc. so those who sell neither fertilizers nor maize seeds are likely selling crop chemicals and 
other non-agricultural products. 
Fifty-three percent of retailers not selling fertilizers in 2006/07 attributed the decision to 
the fertilizer subsidy program; this number declined to 46% in 2007/08 and rose to 57% 
in 2008/09. In other words, about 50% of decisions made to NOT sell fertilizer are 
influenced strongly by the subsidy program. Other reasons given were related to general 
business strategies (“have never sold fertilizers”) or access problems (“couldn’t find a 
supplier”, “didn’t have finances needed for purchase”). 
5.2 Returns to input sales over time 
A key evaluation concern is how the program has affected sales revenues and profits of 
input retailers. In March of 2009 (5-6 months into the input marketing season), 
respondents were asked to compare their expectations for 2008/09 sales revenues with 
revenues realized in 2007/08; 201 of the 230 retailers provided a response (Table 5.2).   
Table 5.2: Retailers sales/profit expectations for 2008/09 compared to 2007/08.  
Response Government Distributors Coops Agro-dealers Total 
Higher 44 (79%) 27 (44%) 4 (50%) 38 (50%) 113 (56%) 
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Lower   6 (11%) 32 (53%) 5 (50%) 26 (34%)  69 (34%) 
Same   6 (11%)   1 ( 3%) 0 12 (15%)  19 (10%) 
Source: Retailer survey. 
Note:  the question was : Do you expect your2008/09 input sales revenue/profits to be higher, lower, or the 
same as last year (2007/08)? Percents shown are column percents. 
Distributors, whose 2008/09 exclusion from the fertilizer program led to significant 
reductions in fertilizer sales, were the only group with more than half of respondents 
anticipating lower returns. Overall, there were more respondents anticipating sales and 
income growth (56%) than decline (34%). Reasons offered by different categories of 
retailers for expecting higher sales revenues or profits in 2008/09 over 2007/08 included: 
• Agro-dealers cited growing demand for inputs by farmers (62%), good rains 
(8%), the subsidy program (8%), and a variety of business factors (credit, selling 
year-round, lower prices, few competitors, opening branch outlets) that helped 
them to increase stocks/sales (22%). Interestingly, those anticipating increased 
sales/incomes over 2007/08 were more likely to be located in Blantyre district 
(34% of agrodealers with positive outlooks) and Lilongwe (26%) than in the other 
districts surveyed. Kasungu had the lowest number of “optimists” with only 2 
respondents expecting to do better than the previous year.  
• Among the distributors, growing demand for inputs by farmers was also the most 
common response (60%), followed by the subsidy program (20%), and good rains 
(8%). Other factors mentioned were general development of the country, offering 
lower prices, and availability of new seed types. Most of the optimistic 
distributors were located in Mzimba and Lilongwe. 
• Among those interviewed at ADMARC and SFFRFM, the reason for anticipating 
increased sales was primarily the subsidy program (63%), followed by a 
recognition that farmers’ demand was increasing (21%), and a few responses 
referring to an improved stocks situation and few competitors. Most of those 
anticipating increased sales were located in Rumphi (65%), Blantyre (23%), and 
Machinga 21%), with the remaining 9 distributed across Kasungu, Lilongwe, and 
Mzimba. 
5.3 Expansion and contraction of input shops and competition 
Retail outlets surveyed have been operating since 1965 (earliest established ADMARC 
retailer in the survey), with the earliest distributor shop interviewed established in 1982, 
the earliest independent agrodealer in 1986, and the earliest cooperative in 1997. Among 
all types of retailer, the greatest single year of growth was 2006 (the first year of the input 
voucher program that allowed private sector participation). Thirty-five percent of 
agrodealer, 33% of distributor, and 27% of ADMARC outlets opened during the period 
2006 through 2008 with 50% or more of the new openings in each category taking place 
during the 2006 season. 
5.3.1 Defining market areas 
We asked respondents to report on the number of competitors in their marketing area 
each year from 2005/06 through 2008/09. Each respondent defined their marketing area 
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in terms of the average or typical distance traveled by their customers and then reported 
the number of competitors present each year within that distance. The average distance 
that customers traveled to purchase inputs (all types of shops combined) was 13 
kilometers, with 59% of the responses being 10 or fewer kilometers and a few (2%) 
average distances of 40 kilometers or more (Figure 3). 
The mean distance by category of retailer differed, with the shortest average and median 
distances being reported by Government outlets (mean and median of 9 kms.), and the 
next shortest by agro-dealers (mean of 13 and median of 10 kms). 
 
Figure 3: Average distance in kilometers travelled by input retailer customers.  
 
Distributors and cooperatives reported the longest distances (both had mean responses of 
16 km) but the median was higher for the cooperatives (15 km) than for the distributors 
(12 km). The mean distances between distributors, government outlets, and agro-dealers 
were compared and statistically significant differences (t-test at .05 or better) were found 
for each pair-wise comparison.  
5.3.2 Changes over time in the number of competitors 
During 2008/09, the average number of competitors within these self-defined marketing 
areas was 5.4, with government outlets reporting fewer (average of 3) and private sector 
outlets reporting more (average of 6 for distributors, 7 for agro-dealers and 6 for 
cooperatives). Table 5.3 summarizes the competition information by putting retailers into 
categories by stated number of competitors (none; low, 1-5; medium, 6-10; high >10) and 
looking at the differences across retailer types. The 1-5 competitor category contains the 
largest share of retailers for each type of outlet, but there is clearly a tendency for 
government outlets to be more heavily represented in the ‘low” competition categories of 
zero and 1-5 than other types of outlets. These statistically significant differences support 
the conventional wisdom that government outlets do tend to serve more remote locations 
where private sector retailers are less likely to operate; the same pattern was found in the 
retailer survey of 2007. 
Table 5.3 Government and private sector retailer competition levels 2008/09 
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Number of 
competitors 
Government Private Sector 
 Distributers Cooperatives Agro-dealers 
Zero 16.9% 0% 11.1% 4.9% 
1 to 5 66.2% 48.5% 44.4% 39% 
6 to 10 13.8% 42.4% 33.3% 39% 
>10  3.1% 9.1% 11.1% 17.1% 
Source: Retailer survey 
   
Retrospective information about the evolution of the number of competitors in their 
market area for each year from 2005/06 to 2008/09 reveals two different patterns. 
Agrodealers and distributors reported increases in the average number, which increased 
from 5.82 in 2005/06 to 6.72 in 2008/09 for agrodealers (a 15% increase) and from 5.78 
to 5.98 for distributor outlets (a 3% increase). Cooperatives and ADMARC/SFFRFM 
reported increases for 3 years, followed by a decline for the 2008/09 season. For 
ADMARC/SFFRFM there was a 7% growth in the average number of competitors from 
2005/06 through 2007/08, then in 2008/09, when the private sector was excluded from 
the fertilizer subsidy program, the average number of competitors declined to 3.03 (below 
the 3.09 level for 2005/06).  
Whom the respondents viewed as competitors is admittedly a somewhat subjective 
assessment. We suspect that the lower rate in growth reported by distributors, many of 
whom are located in the same markets as the agrodealers, is because they are not aware 
of all the agrodealers and/or do not consider them serious competitors because of the 
limited volumes traded by them. It is not surprising, however, to see ADMARC/SFFRFM 
managers reporting a decline in competition given the decision to exclude private sector 
shops from fertilizer sales in 2008/09. Whether this apparent decline in competition has a 
negative impact on farmers’ access to inputs needs to be examined through analysis of 
the household survey and is not covered here. 
One way to minimize the subjectivity is to look at the percent of retailers who 
experienced an increase, decrease, or no change in number of competitors instead of 
looking at the magnitude of that change.  Spanning the period from 2005/06 to 2008/09, 
private sector retailers were more likely to experience an increase in competitors than 
public sector retailers.  Overall however, most retailers among all categories experienced 
no change in competition (almost 80% of retailers reported that the number of 
competitors in 2005/06 was the same as in 2008/09).  In the shorter term, between 
2006/07 and 2007/08, more retailers of all types experienced an increase in competition 
rather than a decrease.   From 2007/08 to 2008/09, more private sector retailers 
experienced an increase in competition (probably reflecting an increase in retailers selling 
seed and chemicals rather than fertilizers), and more government retailers experienced a 
decrease in competition (probably reflecting a decline in those competing in the fertilizer 
market, which most ADMARC interviewees considered their main market). 
 17
5.4 Community perspective on the evolution of input supply at the retail level 
In a community survey conducted  in 2008/09, questions were asked regarding the input 
supply available to the surveyed communities.   Between 2006 and 2007/08, most 
communities reported that there was little or no change in both the number of nearby 
fertilizer sellers, and the number of hybrid maize seed sellers.  However, this did vary 
significantly across region as shown in Tables 5.4a and 5.4b. 
Table 5.4a  Change in fertilizer sellers, 2006-2007/08 
 Overall Region 
  North Center South 
Increase 16.3% 16.7% 15.6% 16.7% 
Decrease 22.5% 0 21.9% 36.7% 
About the 
same 
61.3% 83.3% 62.5% 46.7% 
Source: Community survey. 
 
Table 5.4b Change in hybrid maize seed sellers, 2006-2007/08 
 Overall Region 
  North Center South 
Increase 21% 15.8% 25% 20% 
Decrease 22.2% 10.5% 12.5% 40% 
About the 
same 
56.8% 73.7% 62.5% 40% 
Source: Community survey. 
While the differences across regions for fertilizer sellers were not statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level they were significant at the 0.10 level (chi-square).  The differences 
across regions for the hybrid maize seed sellers were statistically significant at the 0.05 
level.  In both cases, the South had more communities that experienced a decrease in 
sellers than either of the other regions.  The North and Center had more communities that 
experienced little or no change in the number of sellers.  Additionally, between 2004/05 
and 2007/08 almost 80% of communities across all regions stated that there was no 
change in the number of fertilizer retailers not participating in the voucher program. Most 
of those reporting no change, had zero levels in 2007/08—which implies zero levels 
throughout the period.   
The differences in types of retailers commonly used in the communities in 2008/09 are 
also of note.  Unsurprisingly all communities identified ADMARC as one of the 
commonly used outlets for redeeming 2008/09 coupons.  In 40% of communities, 
SFFRFM was identified as another commonly used outlet.   Over 60% of communities 
reported that a private company (usually one of the distributor outlets)  was a commonly 
used outlet for redeeming coupons, but only two communities (3% of the sample)  
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identified a small trader (agrodealer) as being a frequently used outlet.   There were 
geographical differences in the type of retailer that was used; SFFRFM was significantly 
more likely to be used in the North and Center than in the South, as were private 
companies.  
Although all communities used ADMARC for redeeming coupons, there was a 
permanent ADMARC market in less than half of the communities.  In general, there were 
more communities with permanent ADMARC markets in the North than in the Center 
and South, although these differences were not statistically significant.  Thirty-eight 
percent of all communities were more than 10 km from a permanent ADMARC market.   
Another issue discussed in the community survey was how well the commonly used 
outlets ran.  Specifically, communities were asked how frequently there were long lines 
at the outlets commonly used for redeeming coupons.  The results show some variation 
across store type and across region.   
While long lines at ADMARC and SFFRFM were considered a major problem by over 
70% of the communities, only 60% cited this as a major problem with the private 
companies. SFFRFM had the highest “often/major” response rate, which might explain 
why it also has a higher rate of problems with tipping.   
Table 5.5 Frequency of long lines at outlets commonly used for redeeming coupons, all 
regions, 2008/09 
 ADMARC SFFRFM Small Trader Private 
Company 
Never 5.8% 0% 0% 9.6% 
Seldom 7% 6.3% 50% 11.5% 
Often, minor 15.1% 15.6% 0% 19.2% 
Often, Major 72.1% 78.1% 50% 59.6% 
Source: Community Survey 
There was very little variation across regions, except among private companies.  Private 
companies in the South were much more likely to have long lines never or seldom than 
those in the North and Center, and private companies in the North were much more likely 
than others to have major long lines (often).   
6. Analysis of the seed program and its impacts 
This discussion is divided into two sections. The first is based on interviews with 
representatives of seed production firms and the Seed Trade Association of Malawi; it 
deals with the broad design and implementation issues of the seed subsidy program. The 
second section deals with the retail level and draws primarily on the retailer survey 
results. 
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6.1 Seed producer and distributor perspectives 
The most consistent and important finding is that most suppliers are pleased with the 
voucher program and would like to see it continued.  
6.1.1 Does the voucher program promote competition? 
Interviewees believe that the voucher program has stimulated competition in the industry 
BUT generally not price competition. Some price competition does come into play when 
seeds are placed at the retail level because suppliers try to offer higher commissions than 
their competitors to encourage retailers to promote their products. Most suppliers have a 
sliding scale for distributor commissions. ADMARC usually gets the highest because 
they have the highest sales volume (and also negotiate well); distributors would get 
maybe 5% less than ADMARC and agro-dealers another 2-3% less because the costs of 
supplying them are high and the volumes are low. 
 
Suppliers do not generally use pricing to attract farmers because of high distribution costs 
already incurred in setting up rural supply networks. Most competition is through 
advertising, conducting demonstrations, trying to get products placed close to farmers, 
etc.  These types of competition may well be more appropriate than price competition at 
this stage of demand creation, which requires significant investments in educating 
farmers. Most suppliers have increased their marketing budgets since the program began; 
particularly for promotion of hybrids.  
6.1.2 Does the voucher program promote collusion? 
The major issue this year was the determination of the price that the GOM/donors would 
pay to the seed companies for each voucher. Early discussions with donor representatives 
gave the team the impression that there was a major problem of collusion among the seed 
suppliers prior to negotiations with the donors and GOM to set the price/value of the 
2008/09 voucher. One interviewee stated: “….donors/GOM negotiated poorly and caved 
in to the price demands of the collusive seed suppliers”. Further investigation of the issue 
by the team revealed that the very nature of the GOM/donor decisions about how prices 
would be determined forced the private sector to join forces in putting forth price 
recommendations that were mutually acceptable to all. In other words, the program itself 
is pushing the seed suppliers toward “collusive” practices. 
The private sector wanted a system of “top-ups” for the vouchers so that each voucher 
had a set value and each firm could ask for a variable amount of additional money  
(subject to a ceiling) when the voucher was redeemed for their product—in their view, 
this is how to build price competition into the voucher system. Top-ups allow suppliers 
with higher cost structures or better quality seed to set prices based on these differences. 
One donor expressed the view that without top-ups firms who produced seeds associated 
with higher yields were being penalized because they couldn’t get a price that paid them 
adequately for the better quality and the system might be unwittingly encouraging the 
production of lower quality seed. Unfortunately, the GOM did not want top-ups in 
2008/09, largely because of the elections and the confusion in 2007/08 about top-ups.  
In 2007/08 suppliers had agreed to a 400 MK voucher and a top-up with a ceiling of 90 
MK. Unfortunately, the top-ups created a great deal of bad press for the private sector 
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when a poorly informed Minister made a statement in a public meeting that top-ups were 
not legal and any retailer asking for one was breaking the law. After significant pressure 
from STAM, the Government finally made an announcement that top-ups were legal. At 
the same time, however, the GOM said that government outlets would not ask for top-
ups.  This made it impossible for the seed suppliers, most of whom had already placed 
seed at ADMARC/SFFRFM, to have other distributors and agro-dealers continue to ask 
for top-ups so they virtually disappeared in 2007/08. 
In addition to not authorizing top-ups in 2008/09, the GOM also insisted that there had to 
be a single value set for paying the seed suppliers for their seed vouchers, regardless of 
differences in the costs of production and/or quality of the seed. 
The combination of these two GOM decisions forced the seed suppliers to discuss price 
among themselves and put forth a price that was mutually acceptable to all participating 
suppliers. Box 6.1 provides details on how STAM worked with their members to come to 
their price recommendations.  
Yes, our conclusion is that there was “collusion” among seed suppliers, but it seems to 
have been forced on the suppliers by the very nature of the program and the rules 
established by the Government. Building top-ups into the seed voucher program should 
resolve this problem and contribute to price competition in the sector. 
6.1.3 Has the program contributed to greater “professionalism” in the sector 
One indicator of the growth of professionalism in the sector is based on the growth and 
performance of the sectors only professional association—STAM. Most signs indicate 
that the Seed Association is functioning well. 
• STAM successfully challenged one seed producer for putting grain rather than 
seed on the market;  
• STAM admitted new members specializing in legume seeds; 
• STAM got ADMARC to stop their practice of selling only one brand of seed at a 
time (see below). 
• General satisfaction with the association was mentioned by all interviewed 
• One supplier’s view of STAM’s role in the seed sector to date: 
o Provides small firms with an opportunity to get involved 
o Try to keep interests of GOM and seed companies both in mind 
o Trying to decrease “ineffective” competiton..the respondent liked to talk 
about “coopetition” 
o Key objective is to maintain good quality seed in the market 
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One missing element in STAM’s performance was the ability (or, perhaps, intentional 
decision not to try) to consolidate general supply and demand data on the sector. The 
evaluation team’s request for a consolidated data base covering all manufacturers was 
met with the response that it was best to collect this information individually from each 
firm.  Building a consolidated data base has been a challenge for the Malawi Fertilizer 
Association also, but they made some progress in this area in 2008/09 (see below).  
A second indicator of the growth of professionalism is related to problems encountered 
by the AISAM agrodealer network and the manner in which they are being resolved both 
through the legal system and through efforts by seed sector actors. In 2006/07 the 
AISAM agrodealer network set itself up as an intermediary between the seed companies 
and a large number of agro-dealers who wanted to sell voucher seed. Seed companies 
delivered seed directly to agro-dealers designated by AISAM, but the financial 
responsibility for the consignment of all this seed was assigned to AISAM, which did all 
the paperwork for voucher redemption, took a fee from the commission offered by the 
seed companies on the redemption value to cover its services, and paid the retailers the 
STAM Seed Voucher Pricing Logic 
The cost of production for seed produced for the 2008/09 season ranged from 720 to 780 MK, depending on the 
supplier. This was a considerable increase over production costs for 2007/08 seed due to:  
• a very high maize grain price at the time the firms were negotiating contracts with their seed 
multipliers;*  
• increases in fertilizer costs (??%) 
• increases in transport costs (??%) 
• increases in seed certification costs (14%)    
According to a STAM source, STAM proposed a voucher value of 720 MK in GOM/supplier negotiations that 
took place in June/July of 2008. When GOM balked, STAM’s counter proposal was 550 MK plus a top-up with 
a ceiling of 150 MK (700 MK max).  Because the GOM didn’t want a top-up, the final value offered by the 
GOM was 680 MK (40 MK below initial STAM proposal but 190 MK above the previous years voucher value 
of 490—i.e., a 39% increase). DfID assisted in negotiations by checking seed prices in neighboring Zambia and 
came to the conclusion that what STAM was asking for was a “middle range price”. This information apparently 
encouraged donors to drop objections to the substantial price increase over 2007/08 levels. 
STAM believes that the donors and GOM who are negotiating prices with them do not understand the 
underlying calendar and procedures for establishing seed prices.  The most strongly argued point was that 
prevailing seed prices at the time that subsidy negotiations take place for the upcoming year (June/July) cannot 
be used as a basis for pricing the new supply of seeds that will be coming on the market following negotiations. 
Most seed suppliers claimed that they set their prices at the beginning of a season and do not change them until 
new seed comes on the market the following year (usually Oct/Nov in Malawi); hence, prices observable in 
June/July 2008 (when negotiations took place) were established in Oct/Nov 2007 and based on seed 
multiplication costs during the 2006/07 campaign. 
Seed prices in June/July can only serve as an indicator IF the costs of production in 2006/07 were very similar to 
those in 2007/08.  This was clearly not the case, as 2007/08 was a year of worldwide inflation in food, energy, 
and agricultural input prices (especially fertilizer). Several interviewees suggested that prevailing maize grain 
prices during the period when contracts were negotiated with seed multipliers (Aug/Sept/Oct 2007 for the 
2008/09 seed supply) would provide a better indicator of future seed prices than the prices of seeds from the 
previous year that were still on the market in June/July. STAM feels that the GOM and donors do not 
understand this because one of the donors’ arguments against the proposed 720 MK price for 2008/09 was that 
the seed price prevailing in several Malawian markets at the time of GOM/STAM negotiations (Jun/Jul) was 
only 520 – 580 MK. This was interpreted by the donors as a rough indicator of what suppliers should accept 
from the GOM for the 2008/09 season.  
* Per several interviewees, seed prices tend to run at least 20-25% higher than grain prices. Multipliers 
apparently know this and take the prevailing grain price into account when negotiating production contracts with 
seed companies. The team was unable to confirm these estimates with multipliers. 
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rest. Per AISAM, the agro-dealer gets 40% of the sales commission offered by the 
supplier and AISAM gets 60%.  Using the agro-dealer commission of 12.5% of the 680 
voucher redemption value cited by one supplier, this would be 34 MK per voucher for the 
agro-dealer and 51 MK for AISAM.  The agro-dealer is expected to pay for unloading the 
shipments at his shop and storage costs (use of pallets to keep seed off the floor, guards, 
etc.); these costs can be as high as 8-10,000 MK for some of the larger dealers. While the 
payments to AISAM by the agrodealers are substantial, the service being rendered to both 
agrodealers and the seed suppliers was also substantial given the level of paper work 
required for voucher redemption. Without AISAM’s support in 2006/07 it is unlikely that 
many agrodealers would have been able to participate in the seed voucher program as 
suppliers lacked the resources necessary to deal directly with so many small, scattered 
retail outlets. 
AISAM ran into cash-flow problems during the 2007/08 campaign; much of it attributed 
to slow private sector sales following the top-up confusion and poor record keeping of 
stocks that were moved from AISAM agrodealers to other locations during the course of 
the campaign. There are several cases of litigation pending. As a result, AISAM 
substantially reduced its support to agrodealers in 2008/09, concentrating on one small 
geographic area and dealing exclusively with one seed supplier. This was a blow to 
agrodealers who were depending on AISAM, but several seed suppliers have begun 
developing direct contracts with some of the agrodealers whom they had supplied via 
AISAM in 2006/07 and 2007/08.  
It is too soon to draw conclusions about the AISAM experience and their future role. We 
may find over time that they played a crucial role in introducing agrodealers to seed 
suppliers, but once the introduction was made the logical next step is for suppliers to 
establish direct contract relationships. This appears to be happening. Our retailer survey 
(see below) suggests that the sector is moving toward a declining number of agrodealers 
selling voucher seed, but it may also be encouraging the retention of the better 
performing outlets. 
As AISAM scaled down its role in linking agrodealers to maize seed suppliers, it 
officially became a seed producer in 2008/09 and obtained GOM authorization to directly 
sell legume seeds and redeem flexi-vouchers.  This move was clearly stimulated by the 
introduction of the flexi-voucher and the scarcity of legume seeds on the market. Per 
AISAM, this is going well. As a result of this new activity, AISAM has become a 
member of STAM. 
6.1.4 Growth in seed supplier sales and income 
The shift to more hybrids as a share of total sales has increased profits for some firms. 
This is simple to understand as one needs 4 kg of OPV to get the same revenue as 2 kg of 
hybrid, and transport costs for 2 kg of hybrid is lower. 
 
All interviewees have increased their seed sales since the program began; some more 
than others. One respondent’s rough overview of the industry growth is revealing in 
terms of thinking about what will happen if the subsidy program ends:  
• 4.5 thousand tons of improved seed sold before vouchers 
• 9-10,000 tons sold now 
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• Withdraw seed subsidy and sales will drop to about 6.5 thousand tons 
• Withdraw fertilizer subsidy and sales will drop to 5,000 tons (very small increase 
over pre-subsidy level of 4.5 thousand tons). 
The one caveat concerning the removal of fertilizer subsidies was that rising maize prices 
may encourage more maize production and use of hybrids even without the fertilizer 
subsidy. 
 
Most interviewed believed that if the seed voucher program stopped, about 40% of 
farmers now purchasing with vouchers would find money to continue purchasing. The 
one exception to this view was a supplier of OPV who argued that in the area they served 
farmers were still too poor to purchase improved seed without assistance and sales would 
plummet to pre-voucher levels. All believed that if the fertilizer subsidy stopped, it would 
result in a much bigger decline in seed demand than if the seed subsidy stopped, but most 
could not offer a specific percentage decline from current demand. 
6.1.5 Views on different aspects of the subsidy program 
Seed company participation in the AISP. Most thought that the system of selecting 
participating firms was equitable (primarily because the GOM relied on STAM 
recommendations). In general, any firm producing seed in Malawi is eligible; this 
excludes international firms who sell only imported seeds. As the evaluation team did not 
interview firms denied participation, we do not have an alternative perspective here. 
 
Role of independent agrodealers. Most suppliers believe that the agro-dealer network is 
important to developing their markets and have placed seed on consignment with agro-
dealers, initially indirectly through AISAM and increasingly through direct contracts. 
 
Role of ADMARC/SFFRFM. Most believe that Government outlets play an important 
role in the seed distribution system; observations concerning ADMARC/SFFRFM 
included: 
• They have an excellent distribution network but poor management 
• Poor management illustrated by: 
o Not submitting vouchers on time 
o Not allowing farmers to select the brand of seed that they want for their 
voucher (many ADMARC outlets decided to distribute only one type of 
seed until those stocks ran out and then the next type—there is some 
suspicion of payoffs by some suppliers to encourage this, but no solid 
evidence—the practice was discontinued when one supplier brought it to 
the attention of STAM and STAM met with ADMARC/SFFRFM 
management to insist that the practice be stopped). 
• Most suppliers sold some of their seed through government outlets  
o only one interviewee stated that ADMARC was his preferred outlet (lower 
cost than distributing to multiple agro-dealers and higher volume sales);  
o all others believed that developing their relationships with agro-dealers 
and distributors would be more beneficial in the long-run; 
o one had stopped placing seeds with ADMARC after an initial attempt to 
do so in 2006/07 because it was so complicated administratively. 
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Concerns with the 2008/09 program implementation. 
Most respondents stated that coupon payment was slow but “reasonable” in 2006/07 and 
2007/08, but were very concerned about delays in payment for 2008/09.  
• One firm reported submitting vouchers in December but not receiving any 
payment until February; less than 1/3 of submitted vouchers had been redeemed 
by the end of February. 
• Another firm had received 70% of voucher payments by February for the 2007/08 
campaign but only 9% by that point in time in 2008/09. 
• Only one firm said they were satisfied with 2008/09 payment. 
 No one seemed to understand the reasons for the delays, but rumor had it that the 
problem was being resolved toward the end of the team’s field mission (March 2009).  
6.1.6 Ideas for improving the seed voucher program 
The following bullets represent recommendations received from those interviewed: 
• Allow top up 
• Move to a system of bar coding for vouchers to speed things up and avoid fraud 
• Do not allow flexi-vouchers to be used for maize; doing this makes it difficult for 
the private sector to predict demand and place stocks. Because so many flexi-
vouchers were redeemed for maize, suppliers had to move stocks around a lot 
more than they did when they could predict demand based on the maize vouchers 
distributed. 
• Better information campaign re flexi-vouchers; many farmers thought they were 
fraudulent vouchers because they did not have “maize” written on them and 
therefore did not use them. 
• Late distribution of vouchers led to a lot of unused vouchers in the South; print 
and distribute early. 
• Use national ID system to control who gets vouchers and who cashes them. 
• To realize benefits of increased crop production need to have a parallel program 
to improve crop storage…estimate 20% loss of maize production from poor 
storage. 
• Improve control over who gets vouchers…Many politicians had them in 2008/09. 
• Firms with a large volume of vouchers should look into hiring out the processing; 
some have had positive experience with this in 2008/09. 
• Government should invest more in educating farmers about the benefits of 
improved seed in addition to providing the vouchers. 
• Need to improve the link between fertilizer and seed quantities covered by the 
vouchers. Farmers are getting much more fertilizer than they can use on the 
amount of improved seed available through the voucher program; this results in 
many farmers selling the fertilizer rather than using it. 
• Train and employ more seed inspectors so there are not bottlenecks with the 
certification process; delayed certification leads to loss of seed and deterioration 
in quality while multipliers are waiting for the inspectors to visit their fields. 
• Develop a credit program to assist seed multipliers; MRFC is not adequate. 
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6.1.7 Ideas for improving seed sector in general 
The following points were made by the President of STAM, who said they were all issues 
that STAM was working on. 
• Need to speed up the variety release process (pass pending legislation permitting 
one year of in-country testing if variety already approved in two neighboring 
countries). 
• Address water and electricity costs and reliability of supply: they have become 
major impediments to production. 
• Seed sector is “exempt” from tax but not “zero rated”; they want to be zero rated 
so that they can claim back any VAT paid to others. 
6.1.8 Overall assessment of the seed subsidy impact on the seed supply sector 
Despite the problems described above, the seed voucher program seems to be 
accomplishing much of what we would want a voucher program to accomplish in terms 
of market development: 
• Expansion of business volume for the agro-dealer retail network 
• Increased demand for a product that most farmers didn’t use before the program 
• Confidence among suppliers that about 40% of that increased demand would 
continue without the seed subsidy program 
• Increased investment in seed marketing 
• Increased competition among suppliers (but not price competition) 
• The creation of a seed suppliers association with a number of accomplishments in 
terms of representing the interests of members 
6.2 Maize seed retailer perspective  
6.2.1 Program participation 
Of the 230 retailers interviewed, 198 sold maize seed in 2008/09 and 206 in 2007/08. 
Table 6.1 shows that the number and share of maize seed sellers participating in the 
voucher program declined slightly from 2007/08 to 2008/09. The decline was strongest 
among independent agrodealers (from 47% to 29% of all agrodealers selling maize seed) 
and cooperatives (from 63% to 57%).  By contrast, the number and share of government 
and distributor outlets participating in the seed program increased (6% and 2%, 
respectively).  
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Table 6.1  Number of maize seed retailers who participated in the voucher program and 
percent of all maize seed retailers participating, by type of retailer and year 
Type of retailer Participate 2008/09 Participate 2007/08 
 Number 
Percent of all 
maize seed 
sellers Number 
Percent of all 
maize seed 
sellers 
Distributor 49 79 47 77 
Government 61 95 57 89 
Cooperative 4 57 5 63 
Independent Agro-dealer 19 29 34 47 
Total participating in 
program 133 67* 143 69* 
Total in sample selling maize 
seed 198  206  
Source: Retailer survey. 
*This is percent of total maize seed sellers including those who did not respond to the question about 
participation. 
6.2.2 Impacts of the program on customer traffic and sales revenues 
Participating retailers were also asked about the perceived impact of the 2008/09 subsidy 
program on customer traffic in their shops and on sales receipts. (Table 6.2). A decrease 
in number of customers was the predominant response for participating outlets in the 
distributor category; but all other types of outlets thought the voucher program had 
contributed to an increase in customer traffic. Answers followed the same general pattern 
for the question about sales receipts—down for distributor outlets and up for all others.  
Table 6.2  Perceived impact of the program on number of customers visiting the outlets 
of retailers participating in the voucher program 
Impact Government Distributors Coops Agro-
dealers 
Total 
Increase 42 18 2 14 76 (64%) 
Decrease 7 21 1 1 30 (25%) 
No change 4 4 1 4 13 (11%) 
Total 53 43 4 19 119 
Source: Retailer survey. 
Note: The question asked was: Compared to last year (2007/08), do you think this year’s (2008/09) 
program increased, decreased, or had no impact on the number of customers visiting your shop? 
These same questions asked of maize seed retailers who did not participate in the 
program elicited different response patterns. Of the 55 retailers in this group, only 47 
responded to the questions. They were predominantly agrodealers (38 in number), 
followed by distributors (7) and one each for ADMARC and cooperatives. Sixty-six 
percent declared that they thought their customer traffic had declined as a result of the 
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voucher program and 68% thought their sales receipts had declined. The 9% seeing 
customer traffic increase and the 13% seeing income increase were divided evenly 
between distributor and agrodealer outlets. These results provide fairly good evidence 
that those who participated in the 2008/09 voucher program did better in terms of 
customers and sales than those who did not. It also appears that the non-participants are 
primarily agrodealers, likely a result of the breakdown in the AISAM support to 
agrodealers mentioned in section 6.1.3 above. 
6.2.3 Views on continuing the seed voucher program 
Respondents were all strongly in favor of continuing the seed voucher program. Ninety-
one percent of those participating in 2008/09 wanted the program to continue and 76% of 
those not having participated thought it should continue, even though many in this latter 
group felt that the program had had negative impacts on their businesses. There were no 
statistically significant differences in the response rates to this question across the 
different types of retailers. The primary reason given for continuing was that a lot of 
people benefit from the program (93% of those responding that the program should 
continue gave this reason). The primary reason given for not continuing the program was 
that it prevented the respondents (i.e., input retailers) from selling their products and 
earning money (33% of those responding that the program should not continue); the 
second most common reason was that the program created arguments among villagers 
(21%) and the third most common was that farmers should have a choice of outlets from 
which to purchase their inputs (13%) – this latter was probably more a reflection of issues 
with the fertilizer program than with the seed program. 
6.2.4 Problems encountered with implementing the seed voucher program 
The three types of sales problems most frequently encountered by retailers participating 
in the seed subsidy program are overall seed stock outages, not having the specific 
product that the customer wants, and dealing with long lines of customers because 
voucher sales are concentrated during a very short period of time.  
Of the 133 seed retailers participating in the 2008/09 program 132 responded to questions 
about their experience with these types of problems. Overall, only 26% of participants 
had a day or more when they were completely out of seed stocks; but 58% experienced 
instances where they did not have the specific product that their customer wanted. For the 
total seed stock outages, distributor outlets were much less likely to have experienced this 
problem (12%) than either government outlets (33%) or independent agrodealers (42%). 
There were no statistically significant differences across retailer groups for shortages of 
specific seed products. Long lines were experienced by 58% of participating seed 
retailers, with ADMARC reporting this problem much more frequently (72% of outlets) 
than other types of retailers (<50% of the time). This is likely due to the fact that 
ADMARC lines included both seed and fertilizer voucher recipients while the lines at the 
other shops were only for seed. The result does suggest that farmers would be better 
served by having more outlets available for voucher redemption. We also examined 
differences in the prevalence of these problems across regions, but nothing statistically 
significant was found. 
Responses to this same set of questions by retailers who participated in the 2007/08 
voucher program were more limited in number (only 86 of 144 shops participating) 
 28
because of high turnover in shop personnel, which meant that respondents who had not 
been working at the current location during the 2007/08 campaign were not asked about 
the conduct of the voucher program for that year.  The overall results for the total stock 
outages were identical to 2008/09—only 26% had such problems. Again, ADMARC and 
agrodealers exhibited a higher rate of problems (38% and 27%, respectively) than 
distributors (14%); but the difference was not statistically significant. Outages of specific 
products were less common in 2007/08 with only 49% overall (compared to 58% in 
2008/09) having declared a problem. Given the substantially reduced sample size, it is 
difficult to know if this was a real change or a result of the loss of almost 50 
observations. Problems with long lines were reported by 55 percent (compared to 58% in 
2008/09). Again, the distribution among types of retailers exhibited statistically 
significant differences with ADMARC have the highest prevalence (68%, followed by 
distributors (62%) and independent agrodealers (40%). In comparing years, we note that 
the problem of long lines dropped considerably from 2007/08 to 2008/09 for distributors 
(from 62% to 46%), while it increased for ADMARC (from 68 to 72%) and agrodealers 
(from 40 to 42%). 
These results leave one with the impression that farmers might be better served if some of 
the distribution burden was shifted from ADMARC, which seems to have the greatest 
“long line” problem, to the distributor outlets, which had significantly lower long line 
problems in 2008/09 as well as fewer overall seed stock outages. There is some support 
for this view from the Focus Group Discussions held with other stakeholders. Shifting 
some of the burden to independent agrodealers may be problematic in the absence of 
improved support programs for them given the relatively high levels of seed stock 
outages and specific product outages they experienced in 2008/09.  While their “line” 
problem is considerably less prevalent than for other types of retailers, it is doubtless a 
reflection of the limited stocks most of them are carrying. 
Another type of problem with the voucher program that was encountered by seed retailers 
was fraud.   In 2007/08, 16% of participating seed retailers (all types of outlets) had 
farmers present them with falsified vouchers at least once.  Twenty-two percent of 
government retailers experienced this, whereas 11% of private sector retailers had this 
problem.  In 2008/09, the aggregate number increased to 25%.  Among government 
retailers, 39% were presented with fraudulent vouchers, whereas only 13% of private 
sector retailers experienced this problem.  Additionally, in 2007/08, 43% of retailers had 
farmers present them with more than the authorized number of coupons, while in 2008/09 
42% of retailers experienced this problem.  There was no significant difference between 
private sector retailers and government retailers.  Finally, 25% of retailers had customers 
who were not authorized to present coupons in 2007/08, and this number increased to 
36% in 2008/09. These numbers suggest that problems with fraud may be increasing.  In 
general, there does not seem to be much difference between the experiences of the public 
and private sector retailers, except in the case of falsified vouchers.  Increased security 
features of vouchers in 2008/9 and reduced numbers of fraudulent fertiliser vouchers 
reported as identified by the Logistics Unit suggest that there are ambiguities in 
interpreting information about presentation of fraudulent vouchers to retailers, as an 
increase in reported fraud may indicate an increased ability to detect fraud, with or 
without an increase in fraud, or an increase in fraud, with or without any change in ability 
to detect it. It seems likely that the former may apply. 
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7. Analysis of the fertilizer program and its impacts 
7.1 Fertilizer importer and distributor perspectives 
This section of the report is based on interviews carried out in March 2009 with 11 
representatives of 8 different fertilizer firms and the two agrodealer support networks—
CNFA and AISAM. The Malawi Fertilizer Association (MFA) arranged to meet with an 
evaluation team member on March 7th, following their annual meeting; representatives of 
six of the fourteen member firms were present—two of the six represented firms with 
whom we had not conducted individual interviews so a total of ten firms were contacted. 
7.1.1 2008/09 was a difficult year for distributors 
Our evaluation of the impact of the AISP on the fertilizer sector for the 2007/08 and 
2008/09 campaigns was rendered extremely difficult by the last-minute (October 2008) 
exclusion of the private sector from the retail distribution of fertilizers in return for 
vouchers. It was extremely difficult to arrange interviews and even more difficult to 
obtain the types of industry-level purchase and sales data that we were able to obtain for 
the 2006/07 evaluation.  Most interviewees had no interest in returning to a discussion of 
the 2007/08 program (part of our terms of reference) and there was little to discuss about 
the 2008/09 program but the “exclusion” and the negative impact it was having--
primarily on the distributors who rely heavily on fertilizer sales to maintain their 
networks of retail shops, which provide farmers with not only inputs but also a wide 
range of other services and products (e.g., RAB, Farmers World, Agora, Export Trading). 
Because of our inability to obtain a complete picture of all carryover stocks, imports, and 
sales from each firm for both the 2007/08 and the 2008/09 campaigns, we make no 
attempt to conduct a “displacement” analysis using industry data. In 2006/07 we 
approached the displacement issue from both the industry data perspective and from the 
household survey data. For this round of the evaluation, we will rely entirely on the 
household survey analysis. Several firms did comply with our request for data and the 
Malawi Fertilizer Association has made progress in producing monthly reports on 
fertilizer stocks for a limited number of their members; but a displacement analysis 
comparable to what we conducted in 2006/07 cannot be done without a full accounting of 
transactions from all members.  
Several interviewees did express reservations about the evaluation team’s estimates of 
2006/07 fertilizer consumption and displacement, with most suggesting that total annual 
consumption for Malawi is in the range of 220-280,000 tons (our estimate was almost 
300,000 tons). We cannot rule out dissatisfaction with our use of the data collected in 
2006/07 as a partial explanation for the lack of data sharing in 2008/09, but in response to 
these critiques our data forms were revised to better control for double counting of sales 
between suppliers. 
7.1.2 2007/08 and 2008/09 fertilizer program issues 
The following topics were discussed with most interviewees: 
1. Progress made on recommendations of the 2007 evaluation 
2. Impact of the 2007/08 “distance” incentives on the expansion of distribution 
networks 
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3. Fertilizer sector data and estimates of sales/displacement 
4. Access to foreign exchange in 2008/09 
5. Exclusion from retail sales in 2008/09 
 
The first three points were generally introduced by the evaluation team, while the 4th 
point was systematically introduced early in the discussion by the fertilizer importers and 
the 5th point by the importers with distribution networks.  
Progress made on 2007 recommendations. Most suppliers agreed that improvements were 
made in the program with respect to many of the recommendations made in our 2007 
evaluation report. The most commonly discussed topics included: 
• Voucher format/printing, distribution, and fraud 
• Tenders: timing and transparency 
• Fostering constructive government-private sector dialogue 
Although there was an effort to improve on these aspects of the program, some of the 
adjustments introduced new problems or only partially resolved old problems. 
For example, the GOM’s effort to reduce voucher fraud led to a very secretive approach 
to awarding the printing contracts in 2008/09, but failed to avoid the theft of a large 
number of vouchers that appeared on the market before the program officially began. 
Most suppliers agreed that the GOM responded rapidly and effectively to this breach of 
security, but ended up suggesting that, despite higher costs, printing vouchers outside the 
country might be a better option. A related comment concerned the distribution of sample 
vouchers to distributors. One firm pointed out that the distribution of samples came late 
(after the program began) and the samples were insufficient in number, covering only 
about 1/3 of his retail outlets. This made it very difficult to train staff adequately in the 
identification of fraudulent vouchers, resulting in about 5% of vouchers redeemed by his 
retailers having been fraudulent.  Among ADMARC/SFFRFM retailers who participated 
in the retailer survey, 74% reported that they had received some training in how to 
identify stolen or falsified coupons in 2007/08 and 86% reported that they had received 
training in 2008/09.  All respondents mentioned the problems caused by issuing a second 
round of vouchers. It was very difficult to control for fraud once this happened; it led to a 
new geographic distribution of demand that was unanticipated and required costly second 
movements of fertilizer by both the private sector and Government outlets; and most 
respondents thought that there was no discernable programmatic logic to where the 
supplemental vouchers were distributed.  Furthermore, the supplemental vouchers could 
not be tracked for payment of the “distance” premium, so retailers redeeming theses 
vouchers in remote locations were deprived of that premium. 
Most felt that the goal of distributing vouchers to the neediest farmers was a good one, 
but expressed concern about the timing of the voucher distribution and the large number 
of politicians who seemed to have gotten access to vouchers in 2008/09 and been allowed 
to distribute them as they wanted. 
Most agreed that the vouchers were distributed late in both 2007/08 and 2008/09. This 
caused bottlenecks and long lines at distribution points that could have been avoided with 
earlier distribution of vouchers and earlier opening of ADMARC shops in 2008/09. 
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Concerning the perception of political interference, it is noteworthy that during the 2007 
evaluation, there were many complaints about procedures for distributing vouchers, but 
complaints about “politicians” being involved in the distribution were not common. Some 
interviewees cited examples of traders getting vouchers from politicians and then 
presenting themselves at ADMARC as representing groups of farmers and being able to 
take large stocks away that they subsequently sold at well below prevailing market prices.  
The team has no solid documentation of this link between politicians and traders, but it 
seems to have become the “conventional wisdom” for many. We do have good 
documentation that there was fertilizer on sale in Kasungu markets at prices as low as 
6000 MK per bag. This is significantly below the 11000 MK prevailing price. It was so 
low, that several distributors who were willing to sell at cost or slightly below (about 
10000 MK) were still unable to compete. In the view of the distributors, the only way a 
price could be as low as 6000 MK would be if it were fertilizer obtained through 
fraudulent vouchers or sold into the market by farmer recipients. 
Most agreed that the announcement time of the tenders had improved but the actual 
awarding of the tenders was still too late. Late awards mean that: 
• suppliers whose international supplier will hold prices fixed for less than 90 days 
cannot compete because the tender demands that the price be held fixed for 90 
days; 
• many suppliers cannot obtain credit until they are awarded the contract, so actual 
implementation is slowed down by late tender awards. 
Most agreed that the transparency of the tender process had improved, but cited 
additional improvements needed based on their perceptions of the 2007/08 and 2008/09 
experience: 
• GOM seems to be awarding strictly on lowest price without any effort to evaluate 
the capacity of a firm to deliver; 
• In both 2007/08 and 2008/09 there was at least one firm that defaulted on their 
delivery; 
• In the 2008/09 case, it was a firm that had not been recommended by the tender 
evaluation committee, which considered the bid unrealistically low, but the firm 
was granted the tender anyway (LU report); 
• By the time the default is acknowledged, the GOM incurs the risk of paying a 
significantly higher price to get a replacement shipment (this is documented in the 
LU report of 2007/08, which reported an additional cost of $2.5 million to the 
GOM to obtain the replacement fertilizers); 
• In reassigning the default quantities to other suppliers, all agreed that the process 
was NOT adequate; 
• GOM seems to be going back to suppliers who had offered the lowest prices in 
their initial tender submission BUT this is no indication of the price at which they 
would be able to supply at the time the default is acknowledged—often those who 
did not succeed with the earlier tender might have stocks they are trying to unload 
and be able to offer better prices; 
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• GOM needs to develop a more price sensitive system for filling in the default 
amounts, while better evaluating the ability of those submitting the initial tenders 
to deliver; 
• Also suggested that GOM needs to impose penalties and enforce them on those 
who do not deliver; 
• Most also agreed that SFFRFM should NOT participate in the tender process as it 
represents a conflict of interest, with GOM bailing them out if they cannot deliver 
as promised; 
• Some firms expressed a belief that there are illicit payments made by some of the 
smaller, newer entrants into the business that result in them receiving favorable 
awards.  The team found no evidence to support this claim, but heard it twice. 
Suppliers in general were pleased with the improved dialogue between the private sector, 
donors, and the GOM following the 2006/07 program and our initial evaluation report.  
The creation of the fertilizer and seed traders associations grew out of this effort, frequent 
meetings were held where representatives of the associations were able to discuss their 
points of view and needs with the donors and the GOM, and many improvements were 
made.  Unfortunately, for the fertilizer sector, this improved dialogue came to an abrupt 
end when the GOM announced that the private sector would be excluded from 
participation in fertilizer voucher redemption activities in 2008/09.  This announcement 
came with no warning after the private sector had already:  
• Received draft contracts from the government authorizing their participation in 
retail voucher sales for the 2008/09 campaign; 
• Imported fertilizers over and above the government tenders to sell through the 
voucher program; 
• Placed substantial amounts of fertilizer in their retail outlets. 
One interviewee explained this breakdown in dialogue as due in part to donor personnel 
changes, and less engagement in advocacy for GOM/donor/private sector negotiations 
and transparency.  Whatever the real cause of the breakdown, it represents a major threat 
to the survival of the private sector fertilizer retail business. It is also likely to reduce the 
number of international firms with direct representations in Malawi (YARA has already 
withdrawn, and others are seriously considering it).  
The 2007/08 distance incentive. A major change in the 2007/08 program was the 
introduction of price incentives in the form of variable voucher reimbursement rates for 
vouchers redeemed in remote locations. The objective was to encourage the private sector 
to expand distribution outlets. Most suppliers took advantage of these incentives 
establishing relationships with independent agro-dealers or setting up temporary shops in 
remote areas during the input distribution campaign.  
One donor representative was quite critical of the private sector effort, noting that they 
did not set up permanent shops.  The team’s view on this is that it would not have made 
good business sense to set up permanent shops in these locations after only one year of 
experimentation with the distance incentive.  All fertilizer suppliers underscored the point 
that you CANNOT build a retail supply business on fertilizer only—the product has 
generally low margins and the demand is highly seasonal.  To build a supply system in 
remote locations with very limited fertilizer demand outside the voucher program, it is 
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necessary to establish multi-product retail outlets (this point was already highlighted 
above in the discussion of seed retailers).  The voucher program could have contributed 
to building such outlets had the remote area incentives continued for several years giving 
suppliers and local retailers the time to establish good working relationships BUT the 
abrupt 2008/09 ban on private sector participation in the voucher redemption program 
was a serious set back to such efforts. 
Most respondents felt that there were weaknesses in the way the distance premiums were 
calculated and would have asked for revisions had the program continued.  Several felt 
that they either lost money or just broke even on these sales, BUT they agreed that it was 
in their long-run interests to pursue this type of expansion and had been actively 
negotiating with agro-dealers through the CNFA network to build workable contracts and 
supply chains. We were able to obtain some numbers concerning expansion of shops over 
time. As made clear in the notes, changes in numbers of shops was in response to the 
overall program and general fertilizer supply/demand issues, not just to the remote area 
premium of 2007/08.   
Firm A:  Established relationships with 15 agro-dealers to distribute fertilizer and other 
products (a recognition that inputs alone do not make for a viable retail outlet).  
Firm B: Opened 4 new outlets in 2007/08 and kept them open in 2008/09, but had to 
close many others in 2008/09. Changes from 2005/06 to present for this firm included: 
From 05/06 to 06/07: 94% increase in number of shops 
06/07 to 07/08: 6% increase 
07/08 to 08/09: a decline back to 74% of 2007/08 level  
Firm C:  Focuses on the wholesale market but developed relationships with 3 
agrodealers and one distributor in 2007/08. Believes there is viable fertilizer demand 
outside the subsidy program and is focusing on responding to that demand. 
Firms D & E: Took advantage of the remote premiums in 2007/08 but felt that some 
were not well priced. 
Firm F: Increased the number of outlets by 20% from 2006/07 to 2007/08; both 
commercial and voucher sales were good in 2007/08. Reduced shops to 83% of 2006/07 
level in 2008/09. Stocked fertilizer in shops for 2008/09 season and virtually nothing had 
sold up through March 2009 in several shops, due partially to voucher program exclusion 
but also partially to sharp increases in commercial cost of fertilizers—farmers can’t 
afford it.  
Access to foreign exchange in 2008/09. The foreign exchange issue is not specific to the 
fertilizer sector. It is the result of both rising commodity prices in world markets 
(fertilizer and fuel costs in particular increased Malawi’s need for foreign exchange) and 
the over-valuation of the Malawian currency. One interviewee felt that the GOM had 
failed to accurately forecast the impact of rising prices on the budget for fertilizer and 
fuel, therefore making the problem worse than it might have been otherwise. 
Rumors of a pending devaluation of the Malawian Kwacha have significantly increased 
during the past year; the conventional wisdom at the time we conducted interviews was 
that shortly after the elections in May 2009 there would be a devaluation (this has not 
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happened). These rumors have fertilizer importers extremely nervous because their 
accounts at the Central Bank have not yet been credited with the US dollar funds that 
they need to pay their international suppliers. At the time of our interviews, no one had 
yet exceeded the date by which they needed to make this payment, but many were getting 
very close. Apparently, the US dollars received from tobacco sales are usually used to 
cover fertilizer debt, but this year that did not happen and the Central Bank held all of the 
dollars.  One firm said that if they did not manage to pay off their US $ debt before a 
devaluation, they risked losing $5-7,000,000. Others mentioned obtaining dollars through 
“facilitators”, but with a 20% discount. Other indications of the foreign exchange crisis 
mentioned were the fuel shortage experienced in towards the end of last year. 
Several suppliers suggested that there is a need for the banks and the government to 
shoulder more of the risk associated with exchange rate fluctuations.  One proposed that 
Malawi look at the Indian system where the government apparently “subsidizes” the 
exchange rate. One supplier stated clearly that they would be bankrupt if the devaluation 
took place before they got their US dollar debt paid off. 
A related financing issue mentioned by one supplier was that importers traditionally get 
letters of credit from their banks to finance imports but recently more of the credit has 
been coming directly from the international fertilizer companies.  He believed that this 
would not continue given the uncertainty caused by devaluation and lack of government 
policy consistency, so there may be greater problems procuring fertilizer for the 
upcoming year.  
Exclusion of the private sector from the 2008/09 retail sales. In 2007, input suppliers 
were unanimous in stating that the most important thing the government could do to 
assist the development of a viable input supply network was to ensure policy stability. 
From 2006/07 through the early months of the 2008/09 campaign, this had been 
accomplished…then, with no prior notice, the government decided to make changes in 
the subsidy program that had serious negative consequences for private sector input 
distributors. Unfortunately, the changes were announced very late in the year, after the 
private sector had already… 
• Received draft contracts from the government authorizing their participation in 
retail voucher sales for the 2008/09 campaign; 
• Imported fertilizers over and above the government tenders to sell through the 
voucher program; 
• Placed substantial amounts of fertilizer in their retail outlets. 
Theories about why the government made this decision are wide-ranging. The 
government’s argument is that they did it to better control the vouchers because they 
were not able to ensure that vouchers were redeemed for inputs when they were 
redeemed by the private sector. Government also argued that the private sector was much 
more prone to accepting fake vouchers than ADMARC/SFFRFM shops.  The acceptance 
and presentation of fake vouchers was, however, lower for the private sector than for 
ADMARC/SFFRFM as a proportion of total vouchers accepted. As regards the extent to 
which counterfeit or non standard vouchers (those with serial numbers outside the ranges 
recorded by the Logistics Unit) have been accepted by different outlets, records for 
2007/8 show that these (and sales without vouchers) accounted for 27% of ADMARC/ 
SFFRFM sales and 3% of private retailer sales (Logistic Unit).  
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Whatever the reasons for the decision, it has been very disruptive for the private sector, 
particularly for distributor outlets such as RAB, FW, Agora, Export Trading and 
Nyiombi—all of which depend on fertilizer for a substantial share of their sales receipts 
and profits.  Although we have not been able to collect solid data on this, the distributors 
present at the fertilizer association meeting were very vocal about the importance of 
fertilizer income to their ability to maintain their existing retail networks. Most 
distributor outlets also sell a wide range of other products to farmers (other agricultural 
inputs such as seed and chemicals, groceries and basic staples such a sugar, hardware and 
building materials, agricultural tools and equipment, clothing, etc.). These outlets also 
serve as a local buyer for much of the produce that farmers sell (particularly crops such as 
maize and soybeans).  It is possible that an unforeseen consequence of excluding the 
private sector from fertilizer sales will be a reduction in the geographic coverage of these 
multi-purpose shops and an increased burden on farmers to travel longer distances to find 
buyers for their crops and to purchase basic necessities.  The government will need to do 
a careful assessment of these potential side effects should it decide to continue a policy of 
excluding the private sector from participation in the retail sales part of the fertilizer 
voucher program.  One distributor stated:  
This (exclusion) has badly affected us. We have carry over stock in excess of 
2000Mt. Prices this [next] year will be 50% [lower] resulting in a substantial 
loss. Furthermore, sustaining our network of rural outlets has begun to be a 
heavy burden on the company’s resources in the absence of fertilizer sales. We 
have been contemplating downsizing but have been resisting this strategy in the 
hope that the government will soon change its policies to be more private sector 
friendly. 
The impact of the 2008/09 exclusion of the private sector from fertilizer sales was also 
reported by most distributors to have had a negative impact on their seed sales because 
(1) advertising about the program did not make it clear that seeds were still available 
from private shops, and (2) even farmers who knew that seed was available in private 
shops preferred to make all their input purchases in one stop—that meant a government 
outlet since they had to go there for their fertilizer.  Although most thought the overall 
impact was negative on their seed sales compared to what they would have sold without 
the fertilizer sales exclusion, seed sales represented an increased share of 2008/09 
revenues because of the sharp reduction in fertilizer sales. 
7.1.3 Recommendations for improvements in the program 
The only “new” recommendation the team received came from two interviewees who 
made very strong arguments for the introduction of farmer top-ups to introduce 
competition into the fertilizer voucher system. The basic voucher would have fixed 
values nation-wide, but firms would be able to ask farmers to pay variable  top-ups to 
bring pricing of products more in line with their actual costs.  They noted that this would 
only work if Government outlets were not subsidized in a disproportionate manner that 
enabled them to always sell below the private sector. Neither interviewee addressed how 
the “distance” incentive would be built into this system, but it would be possible to have 
variable voucher values based on distance and also allow top-ups. Note that STAM has 
also strongly advocated the use of top-ups for seed vouchers to encourage competition 
and pricing that better reflects quality differences. 
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All interviewees argued that the private sector must be allowed to sell fertilizer, stressing 
that continued exclusion may jeopardize the survival of the rural retail sector in general. 
Most suppliers praised the efforts of CNFA to support the growth of commercial ties 
between distributors and agro-dealers and were actively pursuing such ties.  Several had 
“graduated” from CNFA support for some dealers and were dealing directly with them 
rather than relying on CNFA for a credit guarantee—an intended result of the CNFA 
program. 
Most of the other recommendations were the standard ones heard in 2007, but with minor 
changes  reflecting subsequent experience in 2007/08 and 2008/09: 
• Need to improve timing of tender awards (awards now more of a problem then 
tender announcement) 
• Need to better evaluate capacity of firms submitting tenders to deliver and 
penalize those who default 
• Need to exclude SFFRFM from the tender process 
• Need to improve the quality and control of vouchers (changes have been made but 
new problems have been introduced) 
• Need to improve the targeting of vouchers and better rationalize the quantities of 
seed and fertilizer going to each recipient (too much program fertilizer on the 
market and selling at prices below FOB costs) 
• ADMARC/SFFRFM should be retained as active participants in distribution and 
retail sales in all markets BUT they need to improve management and should 
NOT participate in the tender process. 
7.2 Fertilizer retailer perspective 
7.2.1 Data issues and subsamples 
Of the 230 retailers interviewed, 176 sold fertilizer in 2008/09, 184 in 2007/08 and 192 in 
2006/07. Sixty-five (all government outlets) participated in the voucher program in 
2008/09 and 113 participated in 2007/08 (64 government, 61 distributor, and 3 
independent agrodealer outlets). Many of these 113 outlets were unable to provide 
reliable data on the 2007/08 season. 
In deciding on an appropriate subset of observations for an analysis of changes over time 
we were confronted with two problems: (1) an unstable sample over time because of high 
levels of entry to and exit from fertilizer sales between 2006/07 and 2008/09 and (2) lack 
of information on prior seasons (2007/08 and 2006/07 in particular). The unstable sample 
makes it difficult to get a clear perspective of aggregate changes in the fertilizer retail 
sector over the time span of the subsidy program—in short, it is difficult to know if 
changes over time in key indicators are a result in changes in the composition of the 
sample or changes in overall behaviour of the retail sector.  Testing for attrition bias 
between the two surveys revealed that many factors including retailer type, region, 
participation in the seed or fertilizer coupon programs in 2006/07, and the percent of shop 
profits that came from agricultural inputs were statistically significant predictors of 
attrition.   
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In an effort to control for this, many of the analyses are conducted on a subset of fertilizer 
retailers who sold fertilizer during all three campaigns. The second problem arose 
because of (a) high mobility among the management and sales staff who were available 
for the interviews and (b) lack of record keeping by many retailers. For example, 36 
percent of the management staff interviewed at government outlets had been assigned to 
their current locations in 2008 or 2009 so they did not know what had happened at the 
same outlet during the peak period of the 2007/08 input campaign. This was also a 
problem with private sector outlets, particularly those of distributors. The combined 
effect of controlling for entry/exit bias and lack of knowledge about earlier campaigns 
results in a small sample of respondents with reliable data for several years—117 
observations.  
For the series of questions about participation in the 2008/09 voucher program, we have 
65 respondents of which 63 provided reliable data (the government outlets that 
participated). For questions about participation in the 2007/08 voucher program, we have 
a sample of 73 respondents (those who participated and are able to answer the questions 
about what the outlet did at that time) comprised of 32 distributors, 38 government 
outlets, and 3 independent agrodealers. For the overall survey, we had 48 distributors and 
4 independent agrodealers who participated in the 2007/08 voucher program, but 16 
distributors and one agrodealer did not have personnel at their shops in 2008/09 who 
were knowledgeable about the 2007/08 season, substantially reducing the number of 
private sector observations available.  Table 7.1 summarizes information on the size and 
composition by type of retailer for the various subsamples examined. 
As a complement to the analyses with the reduced sample sizes, we also provide some 
descriptive information about retailers who sold fertilizers only intermittently and those 
eliminated from the analyses due to a lack of data on the 2007/08 campaign. 
7.2.2 Impacts of the program on customer traffic and sales revenues 
All private sector fertilizer retailers were asked whether the 2008/09 GOM decision to 
exclude the private sector retailers from the voucher program had had an impact on their 
business compared to the 2007/08 season. We had 78 valid responses with 38% 
(primarily the independent agrodealers) saying there was no impact and 62% (33 
distributors/coops and 15 agrodealers) saying there was an impact. The difference 
between the two groups is related to the fact that agrodealers have never been able to 
participate directly in the voucher program, so few had benefited directly from the earlier 
voucher programs while the distributor outlets had been heavily involved in both 2006/07 
and 2007/08.  
Among those reporting an impact, 91% believed that it reduced the number of customers 
visiting their shop and the quantity of fertilizer sold while the others said customers and 
sales increased. The impact on total value of sales revenues was predominantly negative 
(87%), but 4% saw no impact and 9% thought their sales revenues increased. 
If we restrict the sample to the 35 private sector fertilizer retailers who actually 
participated in the 2007/08 program (32 distributors and 3 agrodealers), we have 89% 
having experienced an impact and virtually 100% of those having experienced impacts 
reported negative ones in terms of customers, sales volumes, and sales revenues. Those 
reporting no impact were all distributor outlets.  
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Table 7.1 Subgroups of the fertilizer sample and composition by type of retailer 
Characteristics of sample coverage Type of Retailer Number (%) of 
retailers 
 Sold fertilizer in 2006/07 
Distributor/Coop 
Government 
Ind. Agrodealer 
Total 
70 (36) 
64 (33) 
58 (30) 
192 (100) 
Sold fertilizer in 2007/08 
Distributor/Coop 
Government 
Ind. Agrodealer 
Total 
67 (36) 
64 (34) 
53 (29) 
184 (100) 
Sold fertilizer in 2008/09 
Distributor/Coop 
Government 
Ind. Agrodealer 
Total 
65 (37) 
65 (37) 
46 (26) 
176 (100) 
Sold continuously from  2006/07 
through 2008/09 
Distributor/Coop 
Government 
Ind. Agrodealer 
Total 
63 (38) 
63 (38) 
41 (25) 
167 (100) 
Of the continuous, those able to 
answer questions about both 2007/08 
and 2008/09 
Distributor/Coop 
Government 
Ind. Agrodealer 
Total 
41 (35) 
38 (32) 
38 (32) 
117 (100) 
Participants in the 2007/08 voucher 
program among those who were 
continuous and able to answer 
questions about 2007/08 & 2008/09 
Distributor/Coop 
Government 
Ind. Agrodealer 
Total 
32 (44) 
38 (52) 
3 ( 4) 
73 (100) 
 Source: Retailer survey 
7.2.3 Views on continuing to exclude the private sector from retail distribution 
All retailers who sold fertilizer at least once during the past three years were asked their 
views on whether the GOM should continue to exclude private retailers from the voucher 
program.  Responses reflected the self interest of the different types of retailers, but not in 
a unanimous manner. ADMARC/SFFRFM managers were 66% in favor of continuing 
the exclusion, but a surprising 35% thought the private sector should be allowed to 
participate. Distributors and agrodealers views were more one-sided with 86% of the 
former and 78% of the latter being against exclusion. Cooperatives were evenly split 
between the two points of view. 
A variety of reasons were provided to support the different views, but those in favor of 
allowing the private sector to participate generally cited the need to provide farmers with 
as many outlets as possible to increase fertilizer availability and reduce lines. Those 
opposed (primarily the ADMARC respondents) felt that there was more room for fraud 
when distribution went through the private sector.  This latter argument is not well 
supported by information from focus group interviews about farmers having to offer 
“tips” to ADMARC agents to collect their fertilizers this year, nor by the “loss” of 12,016 
MTS of fertilizer (7% of total supplies) in 2007/08 that could not be accounted for by 
ADMARC (LU final report, April 2008). 
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7.2.4 Problems encountered with implementing the voucher program: 2007/08 
We focus our analysis on the 2007/08 campaign in which both the public and the private 
sector participated and then provide a short overview of ADMARC/SFFRFM views on 
how the 2008/09 campaign was implemented. As noted earlier, the number of 
observations for this analysis is quite limited due to many respondents inability to report 
on the 2007/08 season for their outlet and a few additional observations lost because 
respondents did not answer these specific questions. 
As we did for the seed program, we asked about three types of problems: overall stock 
outages, shortages of specific products, and long lines and compared the results by type 
of outlet (government vs. private sector). Results are shown in Table 7.2. The only 
problem that was statistically different across types of outlets was the problem of long 
lines, more common for the private sector than for government shops interviewed.  
The differences in the prevalence of problems were also examined across regions. The 
only statistically significant difference found applied to the stock outages, which were 
much less common in the North (19%) than in the South (42%) and the Center (52%). 
To examine the severity of the problem, we asked respondents to report the number of 
days that each of the problems was encountered and compared means across the 
government and private sector outlets. Although the results need to be interpreted with 
care because of the limited number of observations, the government outlets appear to 
have experienced more prolonged problems with stock outages (19 vs 8 days on average 
for complete outages and 36 vs 20 days for shortages of specific products) while the 
private sector has more prolonged problems with long lines (an average of 28 days vs. 
20). The difference for product outages was statistically significant (t-test) at the 0.07 
level; the others were not significant at the 0.10 level. 
Table 7.2 Prevalence of 2007/08 voucher sales problems 
Problem 
Overall sample 
(% having a problem) 
Private Sector  
(% having a problem) 
Government outlet 
(% having a problem) 
Fertilizer stock 
outage 36% 31% 40% 
Missing specific 
products 64% 69% 59% 
Long lines 81% 97%* 66% 
Source: Retailer survey. 
*Indicates the difference between the public and private sector was statistically significant (chi square .05 
or better). 
We compare the duration of the problems encountered across years for the small group of 
ADMARC outlets providing data for both years. The number of observations was less 
than 20 for each problem area, making it difficult to find any statistically significant 
differences. The average number of days of general stock outages was lower by 5.5 in 
2008/09 while average days of selected products not being available was similar (1 day 
lower in 2008/09). By contrast, the average number of days with long lines increased by 
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5.5 between 2007/08 and 2008/09. The long line increase is likely a result of ADMARC 
being the only outlet distributing fertilizers in 2008/09. The two changes of 5.5 days were 
statistically significant at the 0.10 and 0.12 levels respectively (t-test). 
Another set of problems that fertilizer retailers encountered dealt with fraudulent 
coupons. We identified three types of fraud: presenting a fraudulent coupon, presenting 
more than the authorized number of coupons, and having a non-authorized customer 
present a coupon.  
Table 7.3 Prevalence of 2007/08 Voucher Fraud Problems 
 
Overall Sample 
(% having a 
problem) 
Private Sector 
(% having a 
problem) 
Government Outlet 
(% having a problem) 
Fraudulent Coupon 48% 64%* 32% 
More than authorized 
number of coupons 42% 55%* 29% 
Unauthorized coupon 
holder 38% 44%* 32% 
Any Fraud 69% 91%* 45% 
Source: Retailer survey 
*Indicates the difference between the public and private sector was statistically significant (chi square .05 
level of significance or higher). 
We also examined the difference across regions.  There were no statistical differences 
found in any of the categories of fraud.  
8. Summary of key findings and recommendations 
Although the primary objective of AISP is to improve food security by assisting farmers 
to increase maize yields and incomes, a secondary objective is to build a reliable input 
distribution system with an appropriate mix of government and private sector services.  
Achievement of a reliable input distribution system requires effective dialog between the 
government and the private sector.  The progress made toward the secondary objective 
since the 2006/07 campaign which integrated the private sector into a large scale 
agricultural input system differs for the seed and fertilizer subsectors. 
Important progress has been made in the seed subsector as a result of the AISP.  More than 5000 
tons of subsidized seed was distributed through a range of retail outlets in both 2007/8 and 
2008/9, and the share of hybrids rose from 53% to 84%.  The private sector estimates that 
effective demand for formal sector maize seed is double pre-AISP levels.  The seed association, 
STAM, has played an effective role in increasing the professional capacity of its members and 
dialoguing with government. To further improve the system, seed suppliers were unanimous in 
calling for the uniform use of top-ups to permit price competition and allow suppliers who do 
have better quality seeds to be paid for this quality. 
Important progress was also made in the fertilizer subsector.  There have been improvements in 
tendering procedures and increased private sector involvement in importation. Through 2007/08 
 41
the private sector also expanded its participation in subsidized fertilizer sales, expanded its 
distribution networks and was developing innovative partnerships with independent agro-dealers.  
The private sector also responded to the financial incentive provided by government to expand 
geographic coverage to include remote locations. 
However all the progress made toward harnessing the capacity of the private sector for fertilizer 
distribution since 2005/6 was unwound by the unexpected decision of GOM in November 2008 to 
rescind the private sector’s authorization to distribute fertilizer in return for vouchers.  Not only 
did the decision undermine hard-won confidence in transparent dialog between the public and 
private sectors, but the timing of the decision could not have been worse in terms of the  financial 
harm imposed on the private sector.  Contracts had already been awarded, fertilizer imported and 
paid for etc.  Because the private sector could not sell subsidized fertilizer they were also placed 
at unfair disadvantage in relation to subsidized seed sales because farmers want to procure the 
two types of input at the same location at the same time.  Ironically, the private sector companies 
who were most negatively affected by the Government’s decisions were the ones who had done 
most to respond to the government’s desire for expanded access in rural areas – fertilizer 
importers with distribution networks. Those private sector importers specializing solely in 
suppling government were unaffected.   
The immediate result of the Government’s decision, besides loss of credibility with the private 
sector, was the dismantling of private rural fertilizer and related outlets to pre-2007/8 levels.  
There have been reports that farmers faced increased demand for illegal “tips” at some 
government outlets, longer waits when stock outs occurred, and lack of choice in seed varieties 
when government depots only distributed one variety at a time for reasons of administrative 
convenience.  Farmers also risk diminished access to agricultural inputs for the dimba season in 
areas where the closure of private sector outlets has occurred, as most government outlets in rural 
areas only operate on a seasonal basis.  
The longer-term consequence is lack of credibility in the government in regard to its 
commitment to develop a commercially viable fertilizer input sector rather than one 
where the private sector is limited to contracts to supply government and farmers are 
dependent for access to subsidized inputs on a state monopoly.   
A number of improvements can be made to reduce costs and increase private sector 
effectiveness in importation of fertilisers:  
• Improve timeliness in fertilizer supply by awarding contracts in line with international 
quotation deadlines; 
• Take full account of conditions of supply, not just lowest price;  
• Follow tender award committee recommendations or provide transparent reasons for not 
doing so; 
• Impose penalties on companies that default on awards; 
• To avoid conflicts of interest, Government-owned agencies should not be allowed to bid 
for government contracts; 
• Make payment for contracts in the same currency that fertilizers are internationally 
traded, or guarantee an exchange rate; 
If in the future, GOM should seek to return to a policy of integrating the private sector in 
rural distribution of subsidized inputs, and can find some way to signal renewed 
credibility, then there are a number of improvements that can be made to increase private 
sector effectiveness: 
• Many of the recommendations for tender awards for fertiliser importation are also 
relevant to contracts for private sector involvement in fertilizer distribution:  
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o improved timeliness,   
o clear guidelines and transparency,  
o penalties for default, and  
• Continue a variable voucher redemption rate for remote locations, or allow a flexible top 
up; 
• Transfer voucher printing to an international company to reduce leakage and/or fraud; 
• Eliminate supplementary voucher distribution; 
• Insist on greater accountability for “lost” vouchers from government outlets. 
Malawi’s AISP has been frequently cited by the news media as a model program for turning 
around the very serious food security situation that prevailed in the country during the early 
2000s and there is good evidence that the seed subsidy part of the program has made a major 
contribution to moving farmers toward more productive maize varieties. However  the continued 
high level of policy uncertainty associated with year-to-year changes in the way that private 
sector input suppliers are allowed to contribute to the overall effort — particularly decisions made 
in 2008/09 with respect to fertilizer sales — do not put the program in the position of a potential 
role model when it comes to building private sector capacity capable of providing reliable, long 
term input supply to all farmers. This is unfortunate as a capable private sector is an essential 
building block in the development of a low cost, sustainable and efficient input supply and 
distributionsystem. 
